INTRODUCTION
All spent nuclear fuel discharged from South Korea's PWRs and CANDU reactors is stored in at-reactor (AR) spent fuel storage pools, with the exception of a small quantity of CANDU spent fuel stored at a dry storage facility.
1 Given that an underground repository for the permanent disposal of spent fuel will not be available for at least three decades, 2 South Korea will have to develop additional interim storage capacity to accommodate the spent fuel as the AR spent fuel stores become saturated. Although there was an early plan for a centralized away-from-reactor (AFR) interim storage facility for the spent fuel, 3 it has been delayed until 2016, 4 due to public opposition in the early 1990s. As a result, much more temporary storage for much longer time periods will be required than was originally anticipated.
With this background, this study estimates requirements for additional spent fuel storage capacity for spent fuel from PWRs and CANDU reactors in South Korea through the year 2030. 5 Then, it evaluates how these requirements could be reduced by intersite transshipment of spent fuel between NPP sites if such transfer is implemented.
PROJECTION OF TOTAL ELECTRICITY AND NUCLEAR CAPACITY
Future spent fuel generation from PWRs and CANDU reactors will depend on projections of installed nuclear capacity, which in turn will depend on the total electricity generation and on the share of nuclear power for that generation over the period of time being studied. For this study, projections are made out to 2030, the time at which an underground repository for permanent disposal of spent fuel could become available.
Projections of Total Electricity Generation through the Year 2030
Recently, the South Korean government estimated total electricity generation and installed nuclear capacity for the years 1998-2015. 6 In order to estimate total electricity generation for the years 2016-2030, this study uses a logistic curve fitting method 7 to estimate per capita electricity generation for the years 2016-2030. Then, total electricity generation can be calculated by multiplying per capita electricity generation by estimated population. Table 1 shows total electricity generation, population, and per capita electricity generation in South Korea, which are used as base data in estimating the projections of per capita electricity generation for the years 2016-2030. The year 1995 is assumed as the base year in the projections of per capita electricity generation. The derived asymptote, i.e., E ∞ , for the annual per capita electricity generation is 9.3 MWh around the year 2045, about 1 MWh higher than 8.2 MWh of the average per capita electricity of the OECD countries in 1995. 
Projections of Installed Nuclear Capacity through the Year 2030
Projections of nuclear power over the next three decades will be affected by a number of factors, e.g., economic growth, public acceptance, and so on. This study assumes two scenario projections for the years 2016-2030. One is a "reference scenario," based upon the assumption of sustained development of nuclear power. The other is a "low growth scenario," based upon the assumption that no new nuclear power plants are built after 2016. For installed nuclear capacity before 2001, real historical data is adopted. For the years 2002-2015, projections by the South Korean government are adopted. This long-term nuclear power supply plan for the years 2002-2015 is given in Table 2 .
Reference Scenario
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reactor in 2017. Then, projections of installed nuclear capacity are adjusted by combination of the deployment of PWRs of 1.0 GWe and 1.4 GWe and a CANDU reactor of 0.7 GWe for the years 2016-2030. The lifetime of all reactors is assumed to be 40 years, although design lifetime of APR1400 is 60 years, 11 except for the first CANDU reactor, which is assumed to be 30 years. 12 
Low Growth Scenario
The low growth scenario assumes that no new reactors will be deployed after 2016. The projection of installed nuclear capacity in the years 2016-2030 for this scenario is shown by the dotted line in Figure 2 AR spent fuel storage facilities at four NPP sites in South Korea: 2,697 tHM of spent PWR fuels and 2,709 tHM of spent CANDU fuels. Table 4 shows the details of the inventory of spent fuels in South Korea. Currently, there are four NPP sites in South Korea: Kori, Yonggwang, and Ulchin site for PWRs, and Wolsong for CANDU reactors. Figure 3 shows their locations. 
South Korea's Nuclear Fuel Supply Plan
Projections of spent fuel generation from the reactors largely depend on the nuclear fuel supply plan. According to the current plan, more than 60% of PWRs will be charged with the Vantage 5H (V5H) fuel assembly of Westinghouse for the years 1997-2009, and all PWRs will be charged with the Korean Next Generation (KNG) fuel assembly after year 2010. 13 The V5H fuel assembly has the same fuel rod array structure and contains nearly the same amount of uranium (461.5 kg per assembly) 14 as that for the typical PWR fuel assembly described in Table 5 . Average burn-up of spent V5H fuel is anticipated to be 43,000-48,000 MWd/tHM, and that of spent KNG fuel to be 55,000 MWd/tHM. 15 For CANDU reactors, the CANDU Flexible Fuel (CANFLEX) is planned to be loaded from around the year 2005. 16 The CANFLEX fuel, which could use 1.2 weight-percent of enriched uranium, has a much higher burn-up potential than conventional CANDU fuel, approximately 21,600 MWd/tHM. 17 The amount of uranium contained in the CANFLEX fuel (18.6 kg per assembly) 18 is nearly the same as that of the typical CANDU fuel assembly.
Spent Fuel Generation for Reference Scenario
Engineering advances in fuel integrity and improved fuel management techniques likely will result in extended burn-up compared to the current burn-up. Based on the nuclear fuel supply plan, this study assumes two burn-up cases for projections of spent fuel discharges through the year 2030. One is "current burn-up case," based upon the current burn-up levels out to 2030. The other is "extended burn-up case," assuming increased discharged burn-up levels for PWRs and for CANDU reactors from 2010 and 2005, respectively.
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Reference Scenario with Current Burn-up Case Based on the projections of the installed nuclear capacity in Table 3 , spent fuel discharges from PWRs and CANDU reactors may be estimated through the year 2030 for the current burn-up case. The historical inventories of spent fuel, given in Table 4 , are combined with these projections to provide estimates of cumulative arisings of spent fuel. The estimates assume a once-through nuclear fuel cycle, with no fuel reprocessing.
Average discharged burn-up levels for South Korean commercial spent nuclear fuel in 1996 were around 43,000 MWd/tHM and 7,100 MWd/tHM for spent PWR and CANDU fuel, respectively. 19 The current burn-up case assumes these burn-up figures during the years 1997-2030. Estimation of annual spent fuel discharges is described in the footnote. 20 Currently, average thermal efficiency levels for South Korean commercial spent nuclear fuel are around 34.9% and 33.7% for PWRs and CANDU reactors, respectively. 21 Constant capacity factors of 80% are assumed during the years 1997-2030 for PWRs and CANDU reactors. Figure 4 shows projections of annual spent fuel generation for the reference scenario with current burn-up. Figure 5 and Table 6 show the projections of spent fuel generation in terms of cumulative inventory. These results include spent fuel discharged from decommissioned reactors. Approximately 43% of the cumulative spent fuel discharged through the year 2030 will be from CANDU reactors, although the electricity capacity of CANDU reactors will be only approximately 8% of total nuclear capacity in 2030.
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Scenario with Extended Burn-up
Based on the nuclear fuel supply plan in South Korea, the extended burnup case assumes that the average burn-up of spent PWR fuel will increase to 55,000 MWd/tHM after 2010, and that of spent CANDU fuel to 21,600 MWd/tHM after 2005. Figure 6 shows projections of annual spent fuel generation for the reference scenario with extended burn-up. Figure 7 and Table 7 show the corresponding projections of cumulative spent fuel generation. The extended burn-up case shows a reduction of cumulative spent PWR fuel by approximately 15% through 2030, compared to the current burnup case, and of cumulative spent CANDU fuel generation by approximately 47%. 
Spent Fuel Generation for Low Growth Scenario
The low growth scenario assumes that there are no new reactors deployed after 2016, except for a new CANDU reactor that replaces a decommissioned one in 2017. Table 8 shows the projections of cumulative spent fuel generation for the low growth scenario with current and extended burn-up. The low growth scenario shows reductions of cumulative spent PWR fuel generation to 2030 of approximately 10% and 9% for current and extended burn-up cases, respectively, compared to the corresponding reference scenario.
PROJECTIONS OF SPENT FUEL STORAGE CAPACITY
Status of At-Reactor (AR) Spent Fuel Storage Capacity
All spent fuel discharged from PWRs and CANDU reactors has been stored in AR spent fuel storage pools, or, for some CANDU spent fuel at a dry storage facility, at the reactor site. Table 9 shows the status of AR spent fuel storage capacities at the four NPP sites in South Korea. The pool capacity of each planned PWR is assumed to be 461 tHM, 23 the same capacity as that of Yonggwang 5 and 6 (Korean Standard Nuclear Power Plants), and that of the new planned CANDU reactor to be 579 tHM.
Additional Spent Fuel Storage Capacity for Reference Scenario
Additional spent fuel storage requirements are then estimated for two cases: (1) no intersite transshipment allowed, and (2) intersite transshipment allowed. In both cases, it is assumed that no spent fuel will be reprocessed or sent out of country in the indicated time period.
Reference Scenario with No Intersite Transshipments
The no intersite transshipment case assumes that spent fuel transfer between sites is not allowed, but that transfer between NPPs at the same site is allowed. A reactor whose pool is full may ship its discharged fuel assemblies to another reactor pool that has more capacity. For spent fuel to be discharged from decommissioned reactors, five years are assumed for the movement of all spent fuel from pools to other storage pools at the same site after plant shutdown.
24 Table 10 shows the years when Kori, Yonggwang, Ulchin, and Wolsong sites are expected to saturate their spent fuel storage capacities for the reference scenario with no intersite transshipment for both burn-up cases. In the extended burn-up case, the saturation times of pool capacities are prolonged by just a few years because of late commencement times of extended burn-up for PWRs and CANDU reactors, compared to the current burn-up case. Table 11 shows the cumulative additional storage capacity required for the reference scenario with no intersite transshipment for both burn-up cases. The extended burn-up case shows a reduction of additional spent fuel storage capacity requirements of approximately 29% and 67% by 2030 for PWRs and CANDU reactors, respectively, compared to the current burn-up case. 
Reference Scenario with Intersite Transshipments Allowed
The intersite transshipment case assumes that spent fuel transfer is allowed between NPP sites of the same reactor type. Table 12 shows the cumulative additional storage capacity for the reference scenario with intersite transshipment for both burn-up cases. If intersite transshipment is allowed, even for the current burn-up case, no additional spent PWR fuel storage capacity will be needed to the year 2029.
Additional Spent Fuel Storage Capacity for Low Growth Scenario
For the low growth scenario with no intersite transshipment, the poolsaturation times at NPP sites and cumulative additional storage capacity required will be unchanged from those for the reference scenario, as given in Table 10 and Table 11 . With intersite transshipment, the pool-saturation times are shortened and the cumulative additional storage capacities are increased, compared to those for the reference scenario, because of no further increase of pool capacity for PWRs after 2016. However, even in this case, there will be no need of additional spent PWR fuel storage capacity by 2023 and by 2027 for the current burn-up case and the extended burn-up case, respectively. 
Note: The year for PWRs sites to saturate their spent fuel storage capacities will be 2030 for the current burn-up case, while there will be no shortage for the extended burn-up case.
ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS Options for Spent Fuel Storage
Through 2015, when pools are saturated, additional spent fuel would be stored on-site in dry-storage facilities. Thereafter, there are six alternative options.
Option 1: Dry storage at NPP sites Option 1 employs on-site dry storage 25 to provide additional storage capacity for AR spent fuel discharged from PWRs and CANDU reactors.
Option 2: Inter-site transshipment starting in 2016
26
Option 2 commences intersite transshipment for AR spent fuel discharged from PWRs starting in 2016, while continuing on-site dry storage for fuel discharged from CANDU reactors. Option 5 sends all AR spent fuel discharged from PWRs starting in 2016 overseas to be stored for 10 years, after which period the fuel will be reprocessed and the separated plutonium fabricated into mixed oxide (MOX) fuel. The MOX fuel would then be sent back to South Korea and burned in PWRs. All fuel from CANDU reactors would continue to be stored on-site in dry-storage.
Option 6: Direct Use of spent PWR fuel In CANDU (DUPIC)
29 fuel cycle after 2016 Option 6 commences the DUPIC fuel cycle for AR spent fuel discharged from PWRs after 2016. PWR spent fuel that exceeds the feed capacity of DUPIC fuel for CANDU reactors is not processed as DUPIC fuel and is maintained on-site in dry storage.
Cost Analysis
For each option, we consider only the costs incurred in managing spent fuel discharged after the pools are saturated. That is, the cumulative costs shown in Table 15 do not include the costs of pool management, including reracking. Also we do not consider costs for the process for disposal or treatment of the spent fuel subsequent to 2030. Cost estimates for all options are described in terms of undiscounted constant dollars (2001 U.S.$) and discounted net present values (NPV).
30 A 5% and 10% per annum discount rate is used for this purpose. All the evaluations are based on projections of spent fuel generation and additional spent fuel storage capacity for the reference scenario used in this study. The unit price assumptions for the component stages used in this study are summarized in Table 14 . Tables 15 and 16 show a comparison of additional cumulative costs for the six options, described in terms of undiscounted and discounted costs. The total discounted cost is calculated by spreading the constant dollar cash flows consistent with the time schedule, and then discounting these cash flows at 5% and 10% discount rate. All costs are presented in 2001 U.S dollars. This study assumes no return of spent fuel to be sent for overseas storage. A cost of 1,000$/kgHM was assumed for the storage price of the spent fuel. The DUPIC fuel fabrication facility is assumed to be constructed at the CANDU reactor site, so transport cost for the DUPIC fresh fuel to CANDU reactors is not considered. In calculating the DUPIC fuel fabrication cost, the DUPIC fuel credit was considered. 3 All costs related with the DUPIC fuel cycle are assumed to be included in the cost of CANDU fuel cycle. * 1 MOX fabrication cost and transport cost from Europe to South Korea include the MOX fabrication cost and transport cost of the MOX fresh fuel and HLW after 2030 until all will be returned. * 2
A cost of 106.6$/kgHM of original spent fuel was used for the storage price of VHLW. Total additional cumulative cost of Option 5 will be $M 4,715, $M 1,397 and $M 474 for discount rate of 0%, 5% and 10%, respectively, for 35.5$/kgHM of VHLW storage price.
1 Construction cost for the AFR storage cost for spent fuel would depend on the types of storage, e.g., dry or wet storage. However, if the South Korean government builds the AFR storage facility as a dry type, its construction cost to store the same amount of spent fuel would be similar to the cost of the on-site dry storage. Note: This study assumes that the extended burn-up spent fuel released from PWR and CANDU reactors will be stored in pools through 2030. Tables 15 and 16 , Option 2 is the least expensive option. In terms of 5% discounted cost, the additional cumulative costs by 2030 for Option 2 are approximately 23% and 41% less than that for Option 1 and Option 3, respectively, for current burn-up case, while approximately 39% and 55% less than that for Option 1 and Option 3, respectively, for extended burn-up case. This reduction is mainly due to the fact that Option 2 allows the maximum existing use of spent fuel storage. The other options are still more expensive, ranging about from 5 to 11 times the cost of Option 2 for current burn-up case, and about from 9 to 27 times the cost of Option 2 for extended burn-up case in terms of 5% discounted cost.
As indicated by
INSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS
Options 2, 3, and 6 call for domestic shipment of spent fuel. For Option 2, the shipment would be 215 tHM per annum for PWR spent fuel from 2016 through 2030. It would be 238 tHM and 166 tHM per annum for PWR spent fuel for Option 3 and Option 6, respectively, for the reference scenario and with current burn-up. For Option 3, further transportation of 347 tHM per annum is needed for CANDU spent fuel for the same time period.
Thus far, only a limited amount of spent fuel has been transported by KAERI, mostly for R&D purposes. 31 Two transshipments have been made between neighboring NPPs at the Kori site. For these purposes, Korean Standard Cask (KSC) series shipping casks have been developed and demonstrated to transport spent fuel safely.
32 Domestic transport of spent fuel is regulated by the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), based on the South Korean Atomic Energy Act. 33 The South Korean Atomic Energy Act permits such shipment if utilities can assure adequate safety of spent fuel under safeguards. The past safety record for spent fuel shipment in the U.S. and in other nations shows its feasibility. 34 Domestic transportation of spent fuel could be provided by road, by rail, or by sea. The last is possible because all South Korean NPP sites are located along the seacoast. Whichever transport is used, the utility will have to provide appropriate measures for shipment of spent fuel, based on routing analysis that considers the overall risk to the public and consultation with affected local jurisdictions.
Options 4 and 5 call for overseas shipment of spent fuel. Such shipment will require consent of the U.S., Canada, and Australia, which are members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and supply uranium to South Korea. The South Korean government has bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements with these states. 35 Options 5 and 6 call for reprocessing and recycling of PWR spent fuel, and will require the prior consent of the U.S., Canada, and Australia because of the same bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements.
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CONCLUSIONS
For the reference scenario and with current burn-up, if intersite transshipment between NPP sites is not allowed, estimated cumulative pool storage capacity will fall short of estimated spent fuel discharges through 2030 by approximately 3,900 MT for PWR spent fuel and 8,200 MT for CANDU spent fuel. The pools will be saturated at current sites between 2006 and 2022. Even with extended burn-up, the pool-saturation times will be delayed only about three years (oneyear for the Kori site). If intersite transshipment between NPP sites is allowed, even at current reactor burn-up, there will be no need for additional spent PWR fuel storage capacity until 2027. 37 Economic evaluations for the six options considered in this study shows that intersite transshipment would be the most cost effective solution to the additional spent fuel storage problem in South Korea.
For the low growth scenario, in the case of no acquisition of further capacity of pools after 2016, if intersite transshipment between NPP sites is not allowed, pool-saturation times at NPP sites and cumulative additional storage capacity required will be the same as those for the reference scenario. If intersite transshipment between NPP sites is allowed, even at the low growth scenario, PWR sites will not become saturated until 2023 and 2027 for the current burn-up and extended burn-up cases, respectively.
Intersite transshipment appears the most straightforward and economic way to relieve the burden of additional spent PWR fuel storage requirements before final disposition if domestic transportation of spent fuel is implemented.
If intersite transshipment cannot be implemented due to concerns about transport of spent fuel or for other reasons, on-site dry storage would be the next most cost effective alternative. 
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